Markets for Networks and Crowds



1/26-28: One-sided matching with applications to kidney exchange

Matching agents to objects via random serial dictatorship, the eating mechanism, Hylland-Zeckhauser and top trading cycles.


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Optional Reading:



2/2-4: Stable Matching with applications to school choice

Matching agents to agents while respecting stability via deferred acceptance and immediate acceptance.


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2/9-11: Market Equilibria with applications to Uber

Market-clearing prices for combinatorial valuations, convergence to equilibrium prices.


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2/16-18: Welfare-Maximizing Auctions with applications to Google AdWords

Welfare-optimal auctions, price of anarchy.


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2/23-3/2: Revenue-Maximizing Auctions with applications to eBay

Incomplete information games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium characterization, optimal auctions.


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3/4-11: Simple Auctions & Pricing with applications to Amazon

Price discrimination, near-optimal auctions, approximation algorithms for pricing, product selection and bundling.


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3/18: Project proposal meetings

3/23-25: Special Topics - TBD

3/30-4/1: Special Topics - TBD

4/6-8: Special Topics - TBD

4/13: Project presentation meetings

4/22-27: In-class project presentations