Markets are the basic mechanism by which resources are allocated to agents. In recent years, computer scientists and economists have re-engineered markets with a particular eye towards efficiency (i.e., that the market optimizes the designer's objective) and stability (i.e., that the market operates in the presence of strategic agents). Examples include diverse settings with their own peculiarities, such as organ donation, school choice programs, course allocation, medical labor markets, and the matching of cadets to army positions.
This advanced Ph.D.-level course gives students a background in combinatorial optimization, matching theory, and the theory of market design, as well as its numerous successful applications and corresponding engineering concerns, and will include several guest lectures by industry experts.
Lectures: Fridays 9am-12pm, MD 221
Course Number: CS 286r
Professor: Nicole Immorlica, Microsoft Research and Harvard University
Email: nicimm at gmail dot com
Office Hours: by appointment
Guest Lecturers: Scott Kominers, Brendan Lucier
Teaching Fellows: Nima Haghpanah (CS) and Ran Shorrer (Economics)
A Course in Combinatorial Optimization, by Lex Schrijver
Two-Sided Matching, by Alvin E. Roth and Marilda A. Oliveira Sotomayor
Additional Readings: current research papers announced in lecture
Grading: based on class participation, homework exercises, and a final project